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Identity
John B. Davis

Economics has only recently begun to employ and analyse the concept of 'identity' as
applied to economic agents, and substantial differences still exist regarding its meaning
and significance. The two main forms of the concept are 'social identity' and 'personal
identity'. Social identity concerns an individual's identification with others, and personal
identity concerns an individual's identity apart from others or their identity as a single
individual through time. Social identity theory has been an important subject of investigation in social psychology since the 1970s (see Brown 2000), whereas personal identity
has been investigated by philosophers in connection with the concept of the self throughout the history of the subject, especially in post-war analytic philosophy (see Martin and
Barresi 2003).
Though social psychology is almost exclusively concerned with social identity, and
philosophy is almost exclusively concerned with personal identity, the two are clearly
related. When we ask who it is that has many social identities, we naturally raise the
question of personal identity; when we ask how a single individual can have many selves
over time, we often associate an individual's many selves with their different social identities. Nonetheless, social psychology and philosophy maintain a fairly sharp division of
labour regarding the two forms, which has created problems for its adoption in economics. Indeed, economics has generally ignored the relation between the two concepts, often
treating instead social identity or personal identity, whereas both forms can be seen to be
part of what is involved in any complete account of the individual economic agent. Thus,
assuming that economics will continue to emphasize individual economic behaviour in
the future, the task it faces is to show how the two forms of the concept can be brought
together in a single account of individual identity.
Two contributions to identity analysis in economics
The first influential appearance of the identity concept in economics is attributed to
Amartya Sen, who introduced it in the form of social identity. Sen (1977) distinguished
between sympathy and commitment, and later argued the importance of commitments
made to social groups, where these are understood in terms of 'identifying oneself with
others of a particular group' (Sen 1999, p. 2, emphasis in the original). At the same time,
in his critique of communitarian thinking, Sen emphasized that one's social identities
are not something that one discovers, and about which one is powerless to decide, but
something one may reason about and evaluate.
Indeed, individuals are generally able to engage in a process of reasoning and selfscrutiny, and this creates the 'problem' of 'the "identity" of a person, that is, how the
person sees himself or herself, both as a whole and more specifically in regard to identification with others in social groups (Sen 2002, p. 215). Thus Sen recognizes that individuals having various social identities are somehow bound up with their having personal
identities. He does not go further to explain just how individuals' social identities and
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personal identities are related, though it can be argued in connection with his capability
framework that being able to engage in a process of reasoning and self-scrutiny is a special
kind of capability for having a personal identity (Davis 2007).
In contrast to Sen's strategy of expanding the standard choice framework, Akerlof
and Kranton (2000) introduced the concept of identity as social identity directly into a
neoclassical utility maximizing framework (see Davis 2006). Individuals' utility depends
on self-image, and self-image depends on how closely individuals' own characteristics
correspond to established social categories (for example, race, gender, religion). When
individuals' interactions with others threaten this correspondence - because they or
others do not behave as their social categories prescribe - this creates anxiety which they
seek to minimize, and this maximizes utility. Akerlof and Kranton draw explicitly on
social psychology's 'social identity approach' and 'self-categorization theory' associated
with the work of Tajfel (1972) and Turner (1985). Akerlof and Kranton do not employ the
concept of personal identity, but for them, the utility function effectively constitutes an
individual's personal identity, since in the standard framework utility functions identify
individuals in terms of their own preferences. Nonetheless, there is little in the AkerlofKranton framework to explain how individuals' social identities and personal identities
are related, since the analysis only explains how individuals maximize utility by making
choices with respect to particular social identities, and not how they make choices across
their different social identities. That is, Akerlof and Kranton essentially re-encounter the
old, unresolved multiple selves problem associated with earlier work by Schelling (for
example, 1984) and others (see Davis 2003, Ch. 4).
For Sen and also for Akerlof and Kranton, then, the main theoretical issue concerns
how we are to understand individuals behaviourally in terms of their having both personal identities and social identities. But that individuals have both personal identities
and social identities also raises important ethical and economic policy issues. Three such
issues are (i) the normative significance of individuals having personal identities, (ii)
the normative tension between personal identity and social identity, and (iii) the consequences for economic policy of taking personal identity and social identity seriously.
The normative significance of individuals having personal identities
Having a personal identity means that one somehow remains the same person despite
change. From the point of view of the individual, this involves maintaining a unity to
one's life whereby one is reasonably consistent in one's choices rather than constantly
changing one's values and goals. Frankfurt (1971) saw this as a matter of having personal
integrity, and being able to regulate first-order desires by higher-order desires, the latter
reflecting the individual's deeper goals, values and commitments. But personal integrity
is then close to moral integrity, as emphasized by Williams (1973, 1981) in understanding personal integrity as resulting from individuals' identity-conferring commitments to
others and the values in which one believes. Indeed, moral integrity seems to presuppose
personal integrity in that individuals need to maintain a unity to themselves throughout
their lives in order to maintain consistent moral views and be moral persons.
An individual thus understood, however, is more than just a consistent moral actor.
Being a consistent moral actor invests the individual with the status of being a moral
being. Being a moral being, in turn, involves having moral respect for others and for
oneself as well. This may be put in terms of the idea that the normative correlate of the
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notion of personal identity is the idea of individual dignity. Moral individuals thus have
dignity by virtue of their consistent treatment of others and themselves as moral beings.
Thus, the normative significance of individuals having personal identities is that they are
thereby invested as individuals with moral importance, where this is understandable as
the idea of individual dignity as a moral concept.
This concept, it should be noted, is altogether missing in standard economics, which
treats individuals in a fully positive manner, and which restricts normative reasoning
to Pareto judgements. Pareto judgements only require some improvement in preference satisfaction. But this ignores the individual as both a moral actor and the subject
of moral action - the idea of individual dignity as a moral concern. The reason for this
lies in the specific conception of the individual in standard economics as a preference (or
utility) maximizer. This preference conception of the individual is unable to explain how
individuals sustain personal identities (Davis 2003, Ch. 3). Thus, the standard preference
conception of the individual is also unable to explain individuals as having dignity or
moral value in and of themselves. This, in turn, has the effect of restricting the scope of
normative reasoning in economics to Pareto judgements.
Enlarging the scope of normative reasoning in economics thus requires a broader
conception of the individual as an economic and moral being. Avishai Margalit (1996)
achieves this by drawing the consequences of there being a social basis for assuming
individuals are objects of dignity. First, individuals have self-respect when society judges
them to be worthy of being treated as beings with dignity. Having dignity with self-respect
leads individuals to treat others morally and also to expect to be treated morally by
others. Second, then, when does self-respect acquire a social basis, or when does society
judge individuals as worthy of being treated with dignity? Following Immanuel Kant,
Margalit answers that it is when society adopts the idea that individual human beings
have human rights.
Similarly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN 1948) links dignity and
human rights. Thus, in normative terms, an enlarged conception of the individual in
economics can be grounded in individual dignity, self-respect and human rights. This
goes considerably beyond the Pareto-based reasoning of standard economics, and helps
to clarify the importance of the concept of personal identity in understanding individual
economic agents.
Normative tensions between individuals having personal identities and social identities
Sen recently posed a set of questions concerning conflicting moral commitments that
individuals may find they have when they consider their commitments and responsibilities to social groups of which they are members and to themselves. One issue concerns
the basis for one's moral jUdgements. It is often argued that 'a person's moral judgments
must be based on the values and norms of the community to which the person belongs,
[and] also that these judgments can be ethically assessed only within those values and
norms' (Sen 2006, pp. 33-4). It is certainly true that values and norms which people
rely on to make moral judgements have social foundations. As Sen says, 'one cannot
reason from nowhere' (ibid., p. 35). But, he adds, while our cultural attitudes and social
beliefs may influence our choices, it goes too far to say that they determine them. Indeed,
making moral judgements involves exercising practical reason rather than simply reciting the claims of others. Moreover, we are members of many social groups, so we often
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have conflicting sets of values and norms. This also makes it necessary for us to exercise
practical reason in making moral judgements.
One issue here, then, is how individuals balance the conflicting claims of their different
social identities. Family and workplace are two social identities with their own respective
goals and time requirements. But because these two domains are so different in nature,
it is not easy to decide how to compare their competing demands. In families, values and
norms are tied to kin and household relationships that emphasize caring and emotional
connection. In the workplace, values and norms are often tied to an impersonal meeting
of one's assigned responsibilities and contributions to one's employer's commercial
success. Thus, when conflicting claims arise, individuals find no common values and
norms with which to adjudicate those claims. The problem is that one's social identities
are usually highly compartmentalized.
Another issue involves the tension between individuals' needs and concerns and those of
the social group(s) to which they belong. The former applies to the individual apart from
others and the latter applies to the individual identifying with others. To go back and forth
between these two vantage points often involves a substantial switch in perspective, since
thinking of oneself as an independent individual and as a member of a group are quite different conditions. That they are often so incomparable means that individuals may not be
able to decide what they owe themselves and the groups of which they are members.
Sen offers one way of addressing these issues in his emphasis on individuals being able
to engage in reasoning and self-scrutiny. As he puts it, '[a] person is not only an entity
that can enjoy one's own consumption, experience, and appreciate one's welfare, and
have one's goals, but also an entity that can examine one's values and objectives and
choose in the light of those values and objectives' (Sen 2002, p. 36). That is, individuals are
reflective beings able to deliberate about their options and themselves rather than simply
be impelled by their tastes to make certain 'choices' . Emphasizing individuals' capacity for deliberation may not provide a predictable basis for explaining how individuals
solve problems of conflicting moral demands upon themselves, but it may offer a way of
explaining how they address problematic choices - a subject which has gained increasing
attention under the label of 'indeterminate rankings' or how individuals rank options that
embody different values (compare Chang 1997).
Consequences for economic policy of taking personal identity and social identity seriously
Taking personal identity seriously requires changing the standard understanding of
the individual economic agent. The standard view is short term in orientation, in that
it focuses on individuals in relation to their decision-making at a certain point in time,
and it does little to assess how the results of this decision-making influence their future
decision-making. When individuals are assumed to have personal identities, they seek to
sustain an identity through time that they understand prospectively - in terms of their
goals, commitments and plans - and retrospectively - in terms of their evaluations of past
outcomes and decisions in light of past intentions.
This long-term view of the individual is both more complex than the standard point-intime view of the individual (involving as it does phenomena such as regret, value revision,
feedback relationships and uncertainty) and also implies a higher degree of indeterminacy
in predicted behaviour. Economic policy targeting individuals on this basis, then, needs
to be more heuristic in nature and subject to multi-valued evaluation criteria.
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Consider, for example, investment in training and education. According to the standard view, individuals make human capital investment decisions by comparing prospective
benefits and opportunity costs. A long-term, personal identity understanding of the indi~
vidual in the simplest before-and-after formulation looks at decision-making at time t2
as an adjustment upon decision-making at time tl' with the knowledge that that at tl was
taken in anticipation of this future adjustment. One such model for training and education choices thus involves individuals making choices at tl that give a range of possible
outcomes, as when one initially selects a general programme, so as to allow a comparison
of further possible pathways at t 2 • But this comparison when it occurs includes a retrospective component in that what possible outcomes actually materialize is unknown until
t 2 , so that t I is also re-evaluated at t2 • This interaction of prospective and retrospective
thinking over many before-and-after episodes creates an identity for the decision-maker
which is partly the result of the individual's decision and partly the result of the effects of
the interactions between those decisions and the rest of the world.
Many individual lives exhibit coherence across their histories of decision-making,
both from a personal perspective and that of others. But this is not the case for many
others, whose life histories appear discontinuous and fragmented. One cannot conclude,
however, that the former state of affairs is preferable to the latter, since well-being can be
high with both continuity and discontinuity in life experience. With respect to the education and training example, increasingly focused pathways and pathways that involve
significant reversals and redirections are both valuable. Thus, economic policy that takes
personal identity seriously needs to accommodate both types of pathways. This conclusion runs counter to the standard, point-in-time human capital model which involves a
highly determinate comparison of prospective benefits and opportunity costs. But that
comparison is not a reliable basis for policy if the more complex account of individual
decision-making is employed, and a higher degree of uncertainty regarding interaction of
prospective and retrospective thinking is assumed.
Taking social identity seriously means recognizing that social groups playa role in
determining social well-being, and that economic policy needs to target the well-being
of social groups as well as the well-being of individuals. According to the standard view,
social well-being is simply the aggregated well-being of all individuals in a society, and
individuals are taken to be socially isolated. However, individuals are not socially isolated in that they depend on the many social groups to which they belong. For example,
individuals live in households, and households permit economies that enhance individual
well-being in ways not available to independent individuals. Thus economic policies that
target households offer an indirect avenue for promoting individual well-being additional
to policies that directly target individuals. This argument applies to all social groups that
provide economic advantages to individuals, enhancing their well-being, such as local
communities and neighbourhoods, racial and ethnic groups, gender groups, religious
groups, and the like.
Designing policies that target social groups requires empirical analysis and evaluation
of possible additional channels for promoting individual well-being, in order to determine effective policy instruments and the magnitudes with which they could be applied.
For example, delivery of health-care services to individuals in communities where cultural
values influence the use of such services requires that delivery be designed sensitive to
those values, and set at levels consistent with what those communities can accommodate.
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However, policy design may be complicated by the overlapping character of social groups
and by individuals' memberships in different social groups. Two social groups may be
strongly interconnected, but many of their members may also belong to other social
groups to which these two groups are not connected.
In conclusion, the relatively recent introduction of the concept of identity into economics has left unaddressed important theoretical questions concerning its integration and
significance. But the ethical and economic policy issues discussed here demonstrate the
practical significance the concept of identity has in both of its main forms: social identity
and personal identity. This practical significance is likely to motivate progress in explaining the role of identity in economics. As there are many ways of understanding social
identity and personal identity, clearly much remains to be done to integrate the concept's
theoretical and practical dimensions.
References
Akerlof, George A. and Rachel E. Kranton (2000), 'Economics and identity', Quarterly Journal of Economics,
115 (3), 715- 53.
Brown, Rupert (2000), 'Social identity theory: past achievements, current problems and future challenges',
European Journal of Social Psychology, 30, 745- 78.
Chang, Ruth (ed.) (1997), Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Davis, John (2003), The Theory of the Individual in Economics, London: Routledge.
Davis, John (2006), 'Akerlof and Kranton on identity in economics: inverting the analysis', Cambridge Journal
of Economics, 31 (May 2007), 349- 62.
Davis, John (2007) 'Identity and commitment: Sen's fourth aspect of the self, in Bernhard Schmid and
Fabienne Peters (eds), Rationality and Commitment, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Frankfurt, Harry G. (1971), 'Freedom of the will and the concept of a person', Journal of Philosophy, 68,
5-20.
Margalit, Avishai (1996), The Decent Society, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Martin, Raymond and John Barresi (2003), 'Introduction: personal identity and what matters in survival: a
historical overview', in Raymond Martin and John Barresi (eds), Personal Identity, Oxford: Blackwell, pp.
1-74.
Schelling, Thomas C. (1984), 'Self-command in practice, in policy and in a theory of rational choice', American
Economic Review, 74,1- 11.
Sen, Amartya (1977) 'Rational fools: a critique of the behavioral foundations of economic theory', Philosophy
and Public Affairs, 6, 3 I 7-44.
Sen, Amartya (1999), Reason before Identity, New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Sen, Amartya (2002), Rationality and Freedom, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
Sen, Amartya (2006), Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny, New York: Norton.
Tajfel, Henri (1972), 'Social categorization', in Serge Moscovici (ed.), Introduction a la Psychologie Sociale, Vol.
1, Paris: Larousse, pp. 272- 302.
Turner, John C. (1985), 'Social categorization and the self-concept: a social cognitive theory of group behavior',
in Edward J. Lawler (ed.), Advances in Group Processes: Theory and Research, Vol. 2, Greenwich, CT: JAI,
pp.77-122.
UN (1948), 'Universal Declaration of Human Rights', Geneva: The United Nations Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, www.unhchr.chludhr/. accessed 7 September, 2007.
Williams, Bernard (1973), 'Integrity', in J .J.e. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 108- 18.
Williams, Bernard (1981), Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973- 1980, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.

See also the entries on: Dignity; Individualism; Amartya Sen; Social economics.

